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Abstract
Network flow fingerprinting can be used to de-anonymize communications on anonymity systems such as
Tor by linking the ingress and egress segments of anonymized connections. Assume Alice and Bob have access to
the input and the output links of an anonymous network, respectively, and they wish to collaboratively reveal the
connections between the input and the output links without being detected by Willie who protects the network.
Alice generates a codebook of fingerprints, where each fingerprint corresponds to a unique sequence of inter-
packet delays and shares it only with Bob. For each input flow, she selects a fingerprint from the codebook and
embeds it in the flow, i.e., changes the packet timings of the flow to follow the packet timings suggested by the
fingerprint, and Bob extracts the fingerprints from the output flows. We model the network as parallel M/M/1
queues where each queue is shared by a flow from Alice to Bob and other flows independent of the flow from
Alice to Bob. The timings of the flows are governed by independent Poisson point processes. Assuming all input
flows have equal rates and that Bob observes only flows with fingerprints, we first present two scenarios: 1)
Alice fingerprints all the flows; 2) Alice fingerprints a subset of the flows, unknown to Willie. Then, we extend
the construction and analysis to the case where flow rates are arbitrary as well as the case where not all the
flows that Bob observes have a fingerprint. For each scenario, we derive the number of flows that Alice can
fingerprint and Bob can trace by fingerprinting.
This work has been supported by the National Science Foundation under grants CNS-1564067 and CNS-1525642. The preliminary
version of this work has been presented at the 51st Annual Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems, and Computers, November 2017 [1].
This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication. Copyright may be transferred without notice, after which this
version may no longer be accessible.
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I. INTRODUCTION
G IVEN the presence of communication systems in daily life and their rapid growth, e.g., cellularnetworks, internet of things, etc., security and privacy has emerged as a vital area of research and
development [2]–[9]. For every communication system, security involves not only allowing authorized
users to communicate a message in a way that the message content is protected from unauthorized
users, but also preventing access by malicious users. Hence, breaking the anonymity of users in an
anonymous network such as Tor, Bitblinder, and Darknet plays a major role in preventing malicious
use of technology.
Even if the messages are encrypted, traffic analysis can be used to infer sensitive information from
the packet characteristics such as timing patterns, sizes, and packet rates. For instance, packet timings
can reveal information about passwords sent over SSH channels [10]. Also, traffic analysis can discover
stepping stone attacks where malicious users employ compromised computers to relay their traffic [11],
[12]. Furthermore, it can be used to find correlations between input and output links of a network to
reveal connections between the links [13].
Unlike passive traffic analysis which involves only recording traffic characteristics, such as packet
timings, active traffic analysis involves both recording and modifying traffic characteristics to embed
information in them. For instance, in flow watermarking [14]–[16], watermarks are embedded into flows
by changing their packet timings according to a unique secret pattern. Therefore, each flow contains
one bit of information indicating whether it contains the watermark. However, in flow fingerprinting, the
embedded patters are used to communicate information such as the identity of the party that performed
fingerprinting [17], the location of the flow in the network where it was fingerprinted [1], and the time
when the fingerprint was embedded. Thus necessarily this will convey more than one bit of information.
Active traffic analysis has emerged as a vibrant area of research recently. In [18], the authors propose
detecting stepping stones using flow watermarking. Peng et al. [19] show that this method is detectable
and propose attacks on it. Wang et al. [20] show that the anonymity of VoIP calls made over an
anonymity network can be broken using watermarking methods. Kiyavash et al. [21] propose a multi-
flow attack on interval-based watermarking methods, which delay packets of specific intervals based on
the value of the watermarks. Houmansadr et al. propose RAINBOW watermarking [14] and SWIRL [15]
which is a scalable traffic analysis method resilient against aggregated-flows attacks. They also study the
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capacity of flow watermarking [22] and propose a flow fingerprinting scheme allowing fingerprinting
of millions of flows by perturbing the packet timings of relatively short lengths of flows [23]. Rezaei et
al. [24] introduce an active fingerprinting method called TagIt that works by slightly delaying packets
into secret time intervals. In [25], [26], the authors consider watermarking and analyze invisibility and
error probability of watermarking schemes in practice.
Previous active traffic analysis methods do not offer theoretical guarantees on the trade-off between
performance (number of the flows) and invisibility, i.e., altering the packet timings so that the outcome
is statistically indistinguishable from intact packet timings. When the traffic analyzer is the warden of
the network who protects the links from being traced by anonymous users (e.g., for de-anonymization),
invisibility of traffic analysis is important since attackers (anonymous users) can evade analysis if they
are aware of the fingerprinting process. Even when the traffic analyzer is not the network warden, the
invisibility of the traffic analysis is crucial in order to hide from the network warden. In this paper,
we consider invisible fingerprinting to trace the input and output links of a network in the presence
of a network warden. Consider an anonymous network where connections between input and output
links are unknown. We model the network as M parallel work conserving queues with Poisson arrivals
and exponential service times (M/M/1 queues) and First In First Out (FIFO) discipline. Queues are
independent and each queue is shared by a flow from the input of a network to the output of the network
and other flows independent of the flow from Alice to Bob (see Fig. 1a). Alice has access to the input
flows and she can buffer and release packets when she desires. On the other side of the network, Bob
has access to the output flows so he can read the packet timings of the flows. Alice and Bob wish
to perform fingerprinting to infer the connections between input links and output links, without being
detected by Willie whose goal is to discover flow fingerprints.
We consider the following problem: in a time interval of length T , can Alice and Bob perform
fingerprinting to link input and output flows of the network without being detected by Willie, and if
yes, how can they do so and what is the maximum number m of flows that they can link reliably? For
the case where packet timings of each flow is an independent instantiation of a Poisson process, we
present the construction and analysis, and calculate the asymptotic expression for m as a function of
T . We first assume flow packet rates are equal and that Bob observes only flows with fingerprints and
consider two main scenarios: 1) Alice fingerprints all flows she observes; 2) Alice fingerprints a subset
of the flows, and the subset is unknown to Willie. Then, we present the extensions to arbitrary flow
rates as well as the case where Bob observes a set of flows in which not all flows are fingerprinted.
The contributions of this work relative to the conference version in [1] are:
• For the case where Alice fingerprints all flows, we present more details of the analysis for both
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(a) Setting 1: The network is modeled as independent parallel M/M/1 queues where each queue is shared between a flow
from Alice to Bob (main flow) and other interfering flows that are independent of the main flow.
(b) Setting 2: The network is modeled as independent parallel M/M/1 queues with single input/output where each queue
conveys a flow from Alice to Bob.
Fig. 1: Alice may fingerprint the flows, and Bob receives the fingerprinted flow after they pass through the network which
adds timing noise to the fingerprints. Willie who is warden of the network protects the links from being traced; he wishes
to determine whether Alice has fingerprinted flows.
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the reliability and the number of possible fingerprinted flows.
• For the case where Alice fingerprints a subset of the flows, in [1, Theorem 2], we presented a
scenario where Alice fingerprints each flow independently with probability q. Here, we present a
slightly different variation of this scheme where instead of a probabilistic selection of flows for
fingerprinting, Alice fingerprints a subset of the flows which is known to both Alice and Bob (see
Theorem 2). Furthermore, the results of [1, Theorem 2] were applicable only for specific values of
q and the total number of flows that yield a close to a maximal number of traceable flows. Here,
we present the results for arbitrary q and number of flows (see Theorem 4.3).
• The extension to the case of arbitrary flow rates was discussed in [1, Section V.B] briefly. Here,
we present the full construction and analysis (see Theorems 3.1 and 3.2).
• We analyze the case where Bob observes a set of flows in which some of them are not fingerprinted.
We present a construction where Bob uses a detector to determine if a flow is fingerprinted (see
Theorems 4.1 and 4.2).
• We present simulation results for Willie’s probability of error, the probability that Alice runs out
of packets, Bob’s probability of error, and robustness of our scheme against changes in processing
time of queues.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the system model, definitions, and
invisibility and reliability metrics employed in this paper in Section II. Then, in Sections III and IV, we
present constructions and analyses for the two main fingerprinting scenarios. In Section V, we present
the extensions of the main scenarios to arbitrary flow rates, and in Section VI, we present the extensions
of the main scenarios to the case where Bob observes flows with and without fingerprints. Section VIII
discusses the results, and Section IX discusses future work. We conclude in Section X.
II. SYSTEM MODEL, DEFINITIONS, AND METRICS
A. System Model
We consider a set of M flows between M pairs of input and output links. We assume the links
are known but not the pairings. Also present are two parties Alice and Bob whose goal is to identify
some or all of the pairings by fingerprinting, without a third party, Willie, detecting this identification.
Moreover, Alice and Bob wish to do so within the time interval [0, T ]. Alice, Bob, and Willie know that
all packet timings are governed by Poisson processes and they the rate of each flow that they observe.
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Alice has access to a subset of the input links where each link conveys a packet flow f (A)i ∈ FA =
{f (A)1 , f (A)2 , . . . , f (A)M }. She is allowed to buffer packets and release them from her buffer but no other
operations (e.g., inserting packets, changing packet ordering). Willie is located between Alice and the
network, and he watchfully observes all of the input links accessed by Alice (FA) to detect whether or
not Alice is fingerprinting flows (see Fig. 1). Willie is able to verify the sources and the order of the
packets. Therefore, if Alice inserts a packet of her own or re-orders the packets on any of the links to
transmit information to Bob, Willie will detect her immediately. Bob observes a subset of the output
links where each link conveys a packet flow f (B)j ∈ FB = {f (B)1 , f (B)2 , . . . , f (B)Mb }. He is only allowed to
observe the time of the arrival of each of the packets in each flow. Bob and Willie cannot manipulate
the flows (e.g., change packet timings, remove packets, insert packets, change packet ordering).
Prior to fingerprinting, Alice generates a codebook of fingerprints and shares it with Bob. The
codebook is secret, and thus Willie does not have access to it. On the other side of the network,
Bob uses the codebook to extract the fingerprints and identify the flows.
Each fingerprint (codeword) of the codebook corresponds to a sequence of inter-packet delays, which
plays the role of a unique flow identifier. Alice embeds a unique fingerprint in each flow, i.e., she buffers
packets of each flow and releases them according to timings associated with a fingerprint. We denote
by Ff ⊂ FA the set of flows with fingerprints. In general, not every fingerprinted flow is observed by
Bob. However, since our goal is to calculate the maximum number of flows that can be traced by Alice
and Bob, we assume Bob observes all fingerprinted flows, i.e., Ff ⊂ FB.
As Willie is only able to read the channel, he cannot change packet timings; however, packet timings
change after they pass through the network. Nevertheless, we present a construction where Bob can
successfully identify the flows.
We model the network as M parallel First In First Out (FIFO) queues with exponential service times
(M/M/1 queues). We consider two settings for the network:
1) Setting 1: each M/M/1 queue is shared by the flow Alice and Bob are monitoring, which we
refer to it as “main flow”, and other flows independent of the main flow, which we refer to them
as “interfering flows”. (see Fig. 1a).
2) Setting 2: each M/M/1 queue conveys just the flow Alice and Bob are monitoring (see Fig. 1b).
Denote by qi the ith queue, and by µi, λi, and λ′i the service rate, the input rate, and the sum of the
rates of the interfering flows at qi, respectively. We term µ′i = µi − λ′i the effective service rate [27]
of qi and we assume Alice knows the effective service time of all queues q1, . . . , qM . The queues are
stable, i.e., λi + λ′i < µi.
First, we consider Setting 1 (shown in Fig. 1a). Assuming the flow rates of the flows observed by Alice
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and Bob are the same (λi = λ) and that Bob observes only the set of fingerprinted flows (FB = Ff ),
we present two scenarios:
• Scenario 1 (analyzed in Section III): Alice fingerprints all flows to which she has access (Ff = FA).
• Scenario 2 (analyzed in Section IV): Alice fingerprints a subset of the flows to which she has
access (Ff ⊂ FA).
Then, considering the same setting for the network (Setting 1 shown in Fig. 1a), we present Scenarios 3
and 4 which are extensions of Scenarios 1 and 2, respectively, to the case that flow rates are arbitrary.
Scenarios 3 and 4 are analyzed in Sections V-A and V-B, respectively. Next, we consider Setting 2 (shown
in Fig. 1b) and present Scenarios 5 and 6, which are extensions of Scenarios 1 and 2, respectively, to the
case that Bob observes fingerprinted flows as well as other flows that are not fingerprinted (Ff ⊂ FB). If
Bob observes a flow f (B)i that is not fingerprinted, the flow can be either coming from Alice (f
(B)
i ∈ FA)
or other inputs of the network (f (B)i /∈ FA). Scenarios 5 and 6 are analyzed in Sections VI-A and VI-B,
respectively. We show that in each scenario Alice can fingerprint the flows invisible to Willie but
distinguishable by Bob. In addition, we determine the number of flows that Alice and Bob can invisibly
and reliably trace by fingerprinting.
Next, we present definitions and describe invisibility and reliability metrics.
B. Definitions
Willie uses hypothesis testing to detect whether Alice is fingerprinting:
• H0: Alice is not fingerprinting.
• H1: Alice is fingerprinting.
Denote PFA as the false alarm probability of rejecting H0 when Alice is not fingerprinting (type I
error), and PMD as the missed detection probability of rejecting H1 when Alice is fingerprinting (type II
error). To give more power to Willie, we assume he knows the probability that Alice is fingerprinting,
P(H1) = 1− P(H0).
Similar to the definition of covertness [28]–[32], we define invisibility [1]:
Definition 1. (Invisibility) Alice’s fingerprinting is invisible (covert) if and only if she can lower bound
Willie’s probability of error, P(w)e = PFA+PMD2 , by
1
2
−  for any  > 0, as T → ∞. We term  the
invisibility parameter.
Definition 2. (Reliability) Alice’s fingerprinting is reliable if and only if for any ζ > 0 and any flow,
the probability of the failure event satisfies Pf ≤ ζ as T →∞. We term ζ the reliability parameter. For
a flow with a fingerprint the failure event occurs when one of the following events occurs:
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• Alice cannot successfully fingerprint the flow since she does not have a packet available to release
when she needs one. We denote by Pf1 the probability of this event.
• Bob cannot extract the fingerprint successfully. We denote by Pf2 the probability of this event.
For a flow without a fingerprint, the failure event occurs when Bob detects a fingerprint. We denote by
Pf3 the probability of this event.
Note that both Pf3 and PFA refer to the (erroneous) detection of fingerprints when flows are not
fingerprinted; however, the former refers to detection by Willie after observing all the flows, and the
latter refers to detection by Bob for each flow.
Definition 3. (Lambert-W function) The Lambert-W function is the inverse function of f(W ) = WeW .
We present results under the assumption that P(H0) = P(H1) = 1/2. We show in Appendix A that
this results in invisibility for the general case where P(H0) 6= P(H1). In this paper, we use standard
Big-O, Little-o, Big-Omega, little-omega, and Big-Theta notations [33, Ch. 3].
III. SCENARIO 1: ALL FLOWS ARE FINGERPRINTED, SETTING 1
Consider Scenario 1: Alice fingerprints all flows she observes (Ff = FA), and Bob observes only
the fingerprinted flows (FB = Ff ). All of flow rates are equal (λi = λ). We consider Setting 1 (see
Fig. 1a), i.e., M parallel M/M/1 queues where each queue is shared by a fingerprinted flow and other
interfering flows independent of the fingerprinted flow. Alice fingerprints the input flows during time
interval [0, T ], and Bob extracts the fingerprints from the flows on the output links of the network to
infer the connections between input and output flows.
Alice buffers packets and releases them according to a fingerprint. She uses a secret codebook where
each codeword (fingerprint) is a unique flow identifier consisting of a sequence of inter-packet delays.
Because the timings of packets that Alice receives as well as the codewords are random, Alice will
face a causality problem: the need to send a packet before she receives it. We give an example of when
Alice cannot successfully fingerprint a flow in Fig. 2.
Consider a flow and assume the inter-arrival times of this flow before Alice makes any changes are
[10µs, 2µs . . .]. Also assume Alice selects a fingerprint C(W ) = [5µs, 3µs, . . .] from her codebook.
Note that the inter-arrival time between the first and second packets of the flow is 10µs but Alice has to
alter the packet timings of the flow to achieve an inter-arrival of 5µs between the first and the second
packets. In other words, she has to send the second packet before she receives it.
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Fig. 2: An example of when Alice cannot successfully fingerprint a flow: the packet timings of the flow received by Alice
and the packet timings suggested by the selected fingerprint are [10µs, 2µs . . .] and [5µs, 3µs, . . .], respectively. Alice faces
a causality problem when she needs to send the second packet since she has to send it before she receives it.
To account for this, prior to fingerprinting, Alice invisibly slows down the flow in order to buffer
packets [29, Section IV]. This ensures she will have a packet in her buffer to transmit at the appropriate
times and can fingerprint the flow successfully.
We calculate the number of flows m = M that Alice and Bob can trace by fingerprinting using this
scheme, asymptotically as a function of T .
Theorem 1. Consider Setting 1 (see Fig. 1a). If Alice fingerprints all M input flows (Ff = FA) whose
rates are equal (λ) and Bob only observes fingerprinted flows (FB = Ff ), then Alice and Bob can
invisibly and reliably trace m = M = O(T/ log T ) flows in a time interval of length T .
Proof. Construction: Per above, Alice uses a scheme consisting of two phases of lengths T1 and T2,
and employs a codebook of fingerprints to embed in the flows. The codebook construction is similar
to the one adopted in [1], [29], [30]. In particular, Alice generates m independent instantiations of a
Poisson process with parameter λT2, where T2 is the length of the second phase, as follows. To generate
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Fig. 3: Alice’s divides the time interval of length T into two phases: a buffering phase of length T1 where packets of each
flow are slowed down, and a fingerprinting phase of length T2 = T − T1 where Alice fingerprints the flows.
the lth codeword (1 ≤ l ≤ m), first a number nl is generated according to a Poisson distribution with
mean λT2, and then nl points are distributed randomly and uniformly in a time interval of length T2 [34]
(see Fig. 4). Therefore, the codebook contains m fingerprints (codewords) {C(Wl)}l=ml=1 . Alice selects
a fingerprint for each flow and applies the inter-packet delays of the chosen fingerprint to the packets
of the flow. The codebook is shared with Bob, not know to Willie.
Alice divides the time interval of length T into two phases (see Fig. 3):
• Phase 1 (buffering phase) of length T1: Alice slows each flow from rate λ to rate λ−∆ to buffer
packets, i.e., if she receives a packet at time τ , she transmits it at time τλ
λ−∆ . This allows her to
build up a backlog of packets in her buffer which ensures that she will be able to fingerprint each
flow during the next phase successfully.
• Phase 2 (fingerprinting phase) of length T2 = T − T1: for each flow, she selects a fingerprint from
her codebook and then alters the packet timings of the flow according to the selected fingerprint.
The lengths of the two phases are,
T1 =
Tmα
1 +mα
, (1)
T2 = T − T1 = T
1 +mα
, (2)
where α is a constant defined later, and m is the number of flows to be fingerprinted.
Analysis: (Invisibility) Similar to the analysis of covertness in [29, Theorem 2], we can show that
Alice’s fingerprinting is invisible. Consider the first phase. We can show that for all  ∈ (0, 1
2
), Alice
can slow down the flows from rate λ to rate λ−√2λ/mT1, and achieve (see the proof in Appendix B)
P(w)e >
1
2
− , (3)
where Pe is Willie’s error probability. Thus, her buffering is invisible. In the second phase, the packet
timings for each flow is an instantiation of a Poisson process with rate λ and hence the traffic pattern
is indistinguishable from the pattern that Willie expects to observe. Hence, the scheme is invisible.
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Fig. 4: Codebook generation: Alice generates a codebook whose codewords (fingerprints) specify the sequence of inter-packet
delays to be embedded in the flows. Each codeword is an instantiation of a Poisson process of rate λmin = min(λ1, . . . , λm)
in a time interval of length T2. For each codeword, first a random variable N is generated according to the Poisson distribution
with parameter λT2. Then N points are placed uniformly and randomly in the time interval of length T2. The codebook is
shared with Bob, but it is unknown to Willie.
(Reliability) Now, we show that Alice’s fingerprinting satisfies all of the conditions in Definition 2,
and thus is reliable. Note that all flows have fingerprints. By the union bound:
Pf ≤ Pf1 + Pf2 . (4)
Thus, to show the fingerprinting is reliable, it suffices to show that Pf1 + Pf2 ≤ ζ for all ζ > 0.
First, we show that Pf2 → 0 as T →∞ for each flow, i.e., Bob can successfully extract a fingerprint
from each flow. Recall that Alice fingerprints all m flows that she observes and Bob observes only the
flows fingerprinted by Alice (FA = Ff = FB). Therefore, m = |FA| = |Ff | = |FB|, where | · | denotes
the cardinality of a set.
Without loss of generality, we assume that flow f (B)i passes through the i
th queue (qi). Denote by Ci
the capacity of qi for the transmission of information via packet timings. Recall that qi is an M/M/1
queue with multiple inputs and outputs and that Alice establishes a timing channel on each input flow
to send a fingerprint to Bob. Recall that qi is an M/M/1 queue with multiple inputs and outputs and
that Alice establishes a timing channel on each input flow to send a fingerprint to Bob. Therefore, we
use the bound on the capacity of the timing channel for a shared M/M/1 queue [27, Proposition 1]:
Ci ≥ λ log ((µi − λ′i)/λ), (5)
where λ′i is the sum of rates of the interfering flows passing through qi, and µi is the service rate of qi.
Note that (5) implies that although qi changes the packet timings of the flow and thus the embedded
11
fingerprint, Bob is able to successfully decode at least Ci nats/second bits from the packet timings of
the flow and thus extract Alice’s fingerprint. From [34, Definition 1], the rate of the codebook is logm
T2
,
and [34, Definition 2], (5) implies that all transmission rates smaller than λ log ((µi − λ′i)/λ) result in
a decoding error probability that tends to zero as T2 →∞. Therefore, we require
logm
T2
< λ log ((µi − λ′i)/λ) (6)
for Bob to successfully extract the fingerprint from f (B)i . Note that (6) holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Hence,
as long as
logm
T2
< C, (7)
where
C = λ log
(
min
i
{µi − λ′i}/λ
)
, (8)
for each flow Pf2 → 0 as T2 →∞. Note that (2) implies that T1, T2 →∞ as T →∞. Therefore,
Pf2 → 0 as T →∞. (9)
Next, we show that Pf1 ≤ ζ , i.e., Alice can successfully fingerprint the flows. Recall that Alice
accounts for the causality problem by buffering packets before she starts fingerprinting. Since in the
first phase Alice slows down the packet rate from rate λ to rate λ − √2λ/mT1, on average she can
buffer 
√
2λT1/m packets. Consequently, we can apply the weak law of large numbers (WLLN) to
show that the probability that Alice buffers more than 
√
λT1/m packets tends to one, as T tends to
infinity. Now, we have to answer this question: noting that Alice has 
√
λT1/m packets in her buffer,
what is the probability that Alice cannot successfully fingerprint f (A)i ?
Because Alice receives and transmits packets on each flow according to two independent Poisson
processes of rate λ, and the Poisson process is memoryless, we model the process as a symmetric
random walk on a 1-D grid to answer this question [29]. The location of the walker corresponds to the
number of packets in Alice’s buffer. The walker goes from location z to z + 1 when Alice receives a
packet, and goes from location z to z−1 when Alice transmits a packet. Denote by Pk,t the probability
of the event that the walker starting from the location z = k reaches the point z = 0, at least once,
during the time [0, t]. Then [29, Eq. (27)]:
lim
t→∞
Pk,t ≤ 1− lim
t→∞
erf
(
k√
8λt
)
. (10)
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Since Alice fingerprints the flows in the second phase, t = T2. Recall that the probability that Alice
buffers more than 
√
λT1/m packets tends to one, as T → ∞. Therefore, we let k = 
√
λT1/m.
By (10), the probability that Alice runs out of packets for flow f (A)i satisfies:
lim
T→∞
Pf1 ≤ 1− lim
T→∞
erf
(

2
√
T1
2mT2
)
= 1− erf
(

√
α
8
)
. (11)
where the equality holds since T1/T2 = mα following from (1) and (2). Note that (11) is independent
of i (index of the flow), and holds for all flows f (A)i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Let
α = (8/2)(erf−1(1− ζ))2. (12)
By (12), (11) yields
Pf1 ≤ ζ as T →∞. (13)
Consequently, by (4), (9), (13), Pf ≤ ζ for all ζ > 0, when T → ∞ and thus Alice and Bob’s
fingerprinting is reliable.
(Number of flows) By (7) and (2), we require
logm
T2
=
(1 +mα) logm
T
< C. (14)
as T2 →∞ (T →∞). In Appendix C we show that we can achieve (14) as long as
m =
1
2
min
{
α−1
(
TC
W (TC)
− 1
)
,
TC
W (TC)
}
, (15)
where W (·) is the Lambert-W function. Since for T > e, W (T ) ≤ ln(T ), Alice and Bob can invisibly
and reliably pair the end points of every flow, and thus break the anonymity of a network (Setting 1
shown in Fig. 1a) with m = O(T/ log T ) flows.

IV. SCENARIO 2: ALICE FINGERPRINT A SUBSET OF THE FLOWS, SETTING 1
In Scenario 1, Willie is certain that if H1 is true, i.e., Alice fingerprints, then all flows are slowed
down in the first phase. In Scenario 2, we add uncertainty to Willie’s knowledge under H1: Alice
fingerprints a subset Ff of the flows, and Ff is unknown to Willie. Therefore, Willie has to investigate
a large set of flows to detect if some are slowed down in the first phase as required for fingerprinting.
We show that Willie’s uncertainty allows Alice to fingerprint more flows without being visible.
Alice fingerprints a subset of the flows she observes (Ff ⊂ FA). For each flow, she selects a unique
fingerprint from her codebook and alters the timings of that flow according it. Similar to Scenario 1,
Alice has T units of time which she divides into two phases: a buffering phase of length T1, which
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ensures Alice can successfully fingerprint, and a fingerprinting phase of length T2 = T − T1. Bob, who
has access to the fingerprint codebook and observes the set of fingerprinted flows (FB = Ff ), extracts
the fingerprints from the flows. The fingerprint codebook is secret and Willie does not have access to
it. The network is modeled by M parallel M/M/1 queues with each queue shared by a flow from
Alice to Bob (main flow) as well as other interfering flows independent of the main flow (Setting 1
shown in Fig. 1a). We calculate the number of flows (m) that Alice can fingerprint using this scheme,
asymptotically as a function of T .
Theorem 2. Consider Setting 1 (see Fig. 1a). In a set FA containing M flows with equal rates (λ), if
Bob observes only the fingerprinted flows (FB = Ff ), Alice and Bob can invisibly and reliably trace
m flows in a time interval of length T , where
m =

M, M = O(1)
o(min{√M, eTC1}), M = ω(1) & M = O(e2TC)
Θ(eTC2), M = ω(e2TC)
(16)
C is given in (8), and C1, C2 ∈ (0, C) are arbitrary constants.
A more accurate characterization of m with respect to M is presented in (26) in the proof below.
Proof. Construction: The construction is similar to that of Scenario 1 except that Alice fingerprints a
subset of the flows that she observes. Recall that all of flows observed by Bob are also observed by
Alice (FB ⊂ FA). Alice knows which set of her flows will be observed by Bob, and chooses them for
fingerprinting (Ff = FB). Note that Willie does not know which subset of FA is FB. Alice generates a
codebook of m fingerprints (similar to Scenario 1) and shares it with Bob prior to fingerprinting, where
m is given in (16). Recall that we calculate the maximum number of flows that Alice and Bob can
trace; therefore, we only consider the case |FB| = m which can be extended to |FB| ≤ m trivially.
Alice’s scheme consists of two phases, a buffering phase of length T1, and a fingerprinting phase of
length T2 = T − T1, where
T1 =
Tα′
ln(1 + 
2M
2m2
) + α′
, (17)
T2 = T − T1 = T
1 + α′/ ln(1 + 
2M
2m2
)
, (18)
α′ = α2. (19)
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Recall that α and C are given in (12) and (8), respectively, and  is the invisibility parameter. Alice
generates fingerprints for her codebook analogous to Scenario 1. The number of fingerprints in her
codebook is m.
Analysis: (Invisibility) For each phase, we show that all operations Alice performs on the flows are
invisible. Consider the first phase [0, T1] where Alice slows down each flow from rate λ to rate λ−∆
with
∆ =
√
λ
T1
ln
(
1 +
2M
2m2
)
. (20)
From Willie’s perspective, the number packets in time [0, T1] is a sufficient statistic to detect Alice [29]. If
Alice does not fingerprint (H0), then the joint probability density function (pdf) of Willie’s observations
is P0 =
∏M
i=1 Pλ(ni) where Pλ(n) is the pdf of a Poisson random variable with mean λ. Note that
Willie knows that m out of M flows observed by Alice is selected to be fingerprinted, but he does not
know which set is selected. Therefore, from Willie’s point of view, if Alice chooses to fingerprint flows
(H1), then each flow will contain a fingerprint with probability
p =
m
M
. (21)
Thus, the joint pdfs of Willie’s observations when Alice fingerprints (H1) is
P1 =
M∏
i=1
(pPλ−∆(ni) + (1− p)Pλ(ni)) ,
where ∆ is the change in flow rate. Note that the change of rate differs from the one in Scenario 1.
Suppose that Willie applies an optimal hypothesis test to minimize his probability of error P(w)e . Then,
we can obtain a lower bound on his probability of error [31, Eq.1]:
P(w)e ≥
1
2
−
√
1
8
D(P1||P0), (22)
where D(P1||P0) is the Kullback–Leibler divergence (relative entropy) between P1 and P0.
Alice’s scheme is invisible as long as she can make Willie’s detector operate as close as desired
to the detector that disregards Willie’s observations and results in P(w)e = 1/2 (see Definition 1). In
Appendix D, we show that for  > 0, √
1
8
D(P1||P0) ≤ . (23)
Thus, (22) yields P(w)e ≥ 12 −  as T →∞, and thus Alice’s buffering is invisible.
The second phase is invisible because the fingerprints are samples of Poisson processes with rate λ.
Combined with the invisibility of the first phase, Alice and Bob’s scheme is invisible.
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(Reliability) The analysis is similar to that of Scenario 1. Since all flows observed by Bob are
fingerprinted (Pf3 = 0), to show Alice and Bob’s scheme is reliable, it suffices to show that for each
flow Pf1 + Pf2 ≤ ζ for all ζ > 0.
Similar to Scenario 1, in Appendix E we show that
Pf1 ≤ ζ as T →∞. (24)
Now, consider Bob’s decoding error for each flow, Pf2 . By (17) and (18), T1, T2 → ∞ as T → ∞.
In order for Bob to be able to successfully extract the fingerprint from each flow, we require
logm
T2
< C. (25)
as T2 →∞ (T →∞). Substituting T2 from (18) and re-arranging yields:
m ≤ exp
(
TC
1 + α′/ ln(1 + 
2M
2m2
)
)
(26)
We show in Appendix F that (26) holds asymptotically as T → ∞, given the value of m provided
in (16).
Consequently,
Pf2 → 0 as T →∞. (27)
By (4), (24), and (27), Pf → 0 as T → ∞. Thus, if M = ω(1), Alice can invisibly and reliably
fingerprint o
(
min{√M, eTC}
)
flows in a time interval of length T , and Bob can successfully extract
the fingerprints, where C is given in (8), and if M = O(1), Alice can invisibly and reliably fingerprint
all M flows in a time interval of length T , and Bob can successfully extract the fingerprints. 
In Scenario 2, we assumed that all flows observed by Bob are also observed by Alice and chosen
for fingerprinting (Ff = FB ⊂ FA). Although this is applicable in many schemes, we present results
for the case where this assumption is relaxed in Section VI, i.e., Bob observes flows with and without
fingerprints.
V. EXTENSION TO ARBITRARY RATES
In this section, we extend Theorems 1 and 2 to the case that the flow rates are arbitrary.
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A. Scenario 3: All flows are fingerprinted and flow rates are arbitrary, Setting 1
Consider Scenario 3, which is the extension of Scenario 1 to arbitrary rates: Alice fingerprints all
of the flows she observes (Ff = FA), and Bob observes only the fingerprinted flows (FB = Ff ). We
consider Setting 1 (see Fig. 1a), i.e., M parallel M/M/1 queues with multiple inputs and outputs,
where each queue is shared between a flow from Alice to Bob (main flow) as well as other interfering
flows independent of the main flow. Here the flows rates λ1, . . . , λM can be arbitrary, and the main flow
passing through the ith queue (qi) has the rate of λi. Alice fingerprints the input flows of the network
in the time interval [0, T ], and Bob extracts the fingerprints from the flows on the output links of the
network to infer the connections between input and output flows.
Similar to Scenario 1, for each flow Alice selects a codeword (fingerprint) from her codebook and
embeds it in the flow by changing the packet timings of the flow. She builds her codebook based on
the minimum rate of the flows λmin = min(λ1, . . . , λM), and to embed a fingerprint (of rate λmin) in a
flow of rate λi, she scales the fingerprint by a factor of λmin/λi to obtain a modified fingerprint of rate
λi, and then embeds it in the flow. In addition, she uses a two-phase (buffering-fingerprinting) scheme
similar to those of Scenarios 1 and 2.
We calculate the number of flows (m = M ) that Alice and Bob can trace by fingerprinting using this
scheme, asymptotically as a function of T .
Theorem 3.1. Consider Setting 1 (see Fig. 1a). If Alice fingerprints all M input flows (Ff = FA) whose
rates λ1, . . . , λm are arbitrary and Bob observes only the set of fingerprinted flows (FB = Ff ), then
Alice and Bob can invisibly and reliably trace m = M = O(T/ log T ) flows in a time interval of length
T .
Proof. Construction: Per above, Alice employs a two-phase scheme: a buffering phase of length
T1 and a fingerprinting phase of length T2 = T − T1 (see Fig. 3), where T1 and T2 are given
in (1) and (2). The codebook construction is similar to Scenario 1, but the rate of the fingerprints
(codewords) is λmin = min(λ1, . . . , λM). To embed a fingerprint in a flow of rate λi, Alice selects a
fingerprint (τ1, . . . , τN) and scales by a factor λmin/λi to generate a modified fingerprint of rate λi,
(λminτ1
λi
, . . . , λminτN
λi
). Since fingerprints are instantiations of a Poisson process of parameter λmin (i.e., its
inter-arrival times are instantiations of an exponential random variable of mean 1/λmin), the modified
fingerprint is an instantiation of a Poisson process of parameters λi. Next, Alice applies the inter-packet
delays given by the modified fingerprint to each flow.
Recall that Bob knows the rate of each flow. Upon observing f (B)i , the flow with packet timings
t¯i = (t
(1)
i , t
(2)
i , . . . , t
(N)
i ) and rate λi, Bob seeks to answer the following question:
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Question 1: Given that Alice used the codebook {C(Wl)}l=ml=1 whose fingerprints are of rate λmin,
what is the index of the fingerprint that was selected by Alice, scaled to rate λi, and transmitted through
qi to produce the output packet timings t¯i?
Analysis: (Invisibility) Similar to Scenario 1, we analyze the invisibility of the first and second phases
separately. In the first phase, Alice slows down each flow of rate λi to rate λi − 
√
2λi/mT1. Using
arguments similar to that of Theorem 1, we can show that [29, Theorem 2]:
P(w)e >
1
2
− ,
where P(w)e is Willie’s error probability. Thus, this phase is invisible to Willie. In the second phase, since
Alice embeds a modified fingerprint of rate λi in a flow of rate λi, the traffic pattern remains Poisson
with rate λi indistinguishable from the pattern that Willie expects to observe. Hence, the scheme is
invisible.
(Reliability) Similar to the reliability analysis in Scenario 1, we upper bound Pf1 + Pf2 by ζ , for all
ζ > 0.
Recall that upon observing f (B)i , Bob seeks the answer to Question 1. Note that the answer to this
question is the same as the answer to the following question:
Question 2: Given that Alice used the codebook {C ′(Wl)}l=ml=1 = λminλi {C(Wl)}l=ml=1 what is the index
of the fingerprint that was selected by Alice and transmitted through qi to produce the output packet
timings t¯i?
In other words, although Alice generates a codebook whose fingerprints are of rate λmin and then
scales each fingerprint to adjust to rate λi of the flow, Bob’s decoding of each flow is equivalent to
the case where Alice uses a codebook whose fingerprints are of rate λi and she does not scale the
fingerprints; the only differences are in the number of fingerprints (codewords) and the time to transmit
the fingerprint, as we will explain later. Therefore, from (6), Bob can successfully extract the fingerprint
from the flow of rate λi as long as T2 is large and
logm
T
(i)
2
< λi log ((µi − λ′i)/λi), (28)
where T (i)2 = T2λmin/λi is the time of the transmission of the fingerprint embedded in the flow of rate
λi. Therefore,
logm
T2
< λmin log ((µi − λ′i)/λi). (29)
Since the size of the codebook is m, fingerprinting the flow fi corresponds to transmission of logm
nats of information through the inter-packet delays of the flow fi. Note that scaling a fingerprint of rate
λmin to rate λi results in transmission of logm nats of information at a higher rate but a shorter time.
18
Since (29) holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we require
logm
T2
< C ′, (30)
where
C ′ = λminmin
i
{log ((µi − λ′i)/λi)}, (31)
to achieve Pf2 → 0 as T2 → ∞ for each flow. Note that (2) implies that T1, T2 → ∞ as T → ∞.
Therefore,
Pf2 → 0 as T →∞. (32)
Now, consider Pf1 . In the second phase, on each link Alice receives and transmits the packets according
to two independent Poisson processes of equal rate. Thus, we employ a random walk analysis similar
to that of Scenario 1 to show that
Pf1 ≤ 1− erf
(

2
√
T1
2mT2
)
≤ ζ as T →∞. (33)
Consequently, by (4), (32) and (33), Pf ≤ ζ for all ζ > 0, and thus Alice and Bob’s fingerprinting is
reliable.
(Number of flows) The analysis is similar to that of Scenario 1. As T →∞, we require
logm
T2
=
(1 +mα) logm
T
< C ′. (34)
which we can achieve as long as
m =
1
2
min
{
α−1
(
TC ′
W (TC ′)
− 1
)
,
TC ′
W (TC ′)
}
, (35)
Since for T > e, W (T ) ≤ ln(T ), Alice and Bob can invisibly and reliably break the anonymity of a
network (Setting 1 shown in Fig. 1a) with m = O(T/ log T ) flows. 
B. Scenario 4: Alice fingerprints a subset of the flows, Setting 1
Consider Scenario 4, which is the extension of Scenario 2 to arbitrary rates: Alice fingerprints a subset
Ff of the flows, and Ff is unknown to Willie. Similar to Scenario 2, since Willie has to investigate a
large set of flows to detect if some are slowed down in the first phase as required for fingerprinting,
Alice can make more fingerprinted flows invisible.
For each flow in Ff , she selects a unique fingerprint from her codebook and alters the timings of
that flow according to the fingerprint. We consider Setting 1 (see Fig. 1a), i.e., M parallel M/M/1
queues with multiple inputs and outputs, where each queue is shared between a flow from Alice to Bob
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(main flow) as well as other interfering flows independent of the main flow. Flows rates are λ1, . . . , λM ,
which can be arbitrary, and the main flow passing through the ith queue (qi) has the rate of λi. Alice
fingerprints the input flows of the network in the time interval [0, T ], and Bob extracts the fingerprints
from the flows on the output links of the network to infer the connections between input and output
flows.
For each selected flow Alice selects a codeword from her codebook and embeds it in the flow by
changing its packet timings according to the selected fingerprint. Since flow rates are arbitrary, similar
to Scenario 3, she builds her codebook based on the minimum rate of the flows to be fingerprinted and
scales each fingerprint based on the rate of the flow to be fingerprinted. Also, she uses a two-phase
(buffering-fingerprinting) scheme.
We calculate the number of flows (m) in which Alice fingerprints using this scheme, asymptotically
as a function of T .
Theorem 3.2. Consider Setting 1 (see Fig. 1a). In a set FA containing M flows with rates λ1, . . . , λM ,
if Bob observes only the fingerprinted flows (FB = Ff ), Alice and Bob can invisibly and reliably trace
m flows in a time interval of length T , where m is given in (16), where C is replaced with C ′ which
is given in (31).
Proof. The construction and analysis follow from those of Scenarios 2 with modifications due to
arbitrary rates. The extension to arbitrary rates follows from that of Scenario 3. 
VI. MIXING FLOWS WITH AND WITHOUT FINGERPRINTS
We have previously assumed that Bob only observes the set of fingerprinted flows, i.e., FB = Ff .
But, in practice Bob might observe a set of flows in which some of the flows are not fingerprinted,
and therefore, he must be able to detect if a flow contains a fingerprint. In this Section, we consider
Setting 2 (see Fig. 1b) and we present Scenarios 5 and 6 which are extensions of Scenarios 1 and 2,
respectively, to the case where Bob observes a set of flows in which some of them are not fingerprinted.
We present a detector for Bob that is able to detect if a flow is fingerprinted.
A. Scenario 5: All flows are fingerprinted and Bob observes flows with and without fingerprints, Setting
2
Consider Scenario 5, which is the extension of Scenario 1 to the case where Bob observes flows
with and without fingerprints (Ff ⊂ FB): Alice fingerprints all of the flows she observes (Ff = FA),
flow rates are equal (λ), and Bob observes flows with and without fingerprints. We consider Setting 2
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(see Fig. 1b), i.e., M parallel M/M/1 queues with single input and output. Alice fingerprints the input
flows of the network in the time interval [0, T ], and Bob extracts the fingerprints from the flows on the
output links of the network to infer the connections between input and output flows.
In contrast to Scenarios 1-4, Bob uses a detector to determine if a flow is fingerprinted. We calculate
the number of flows (m) that Alice and Bob can trace by fingerprinting using this scheme, asymptotically
as a function of T .
Theorem 4.1. Consider Setting 2 (see Fig. 1b). If Alice fingerprints all M input flows (Ff = FA) whose
rates are equal (λ) and Bob observes a set of flows with and without fingerprints (Ff ⊂ FB), then Alice
and Bob can invisibly and reliably trace m = M = O(T/ log T ) flows in a time interval of length T .
Proof. Construction: The only difference between the construction of Scenarios 1 and 5 is that, for
Scenario 5, Bob must use a detector which detects if a flow contains a fingerprint.
Here, Bob’s decoder is different from the maximum likelihood decoder proposed in [34, p. 9], which
for each codeword calculates the service times that yield D¯i, removes the codewords that result in
negative values of service times, and finally finds a unique codeword that corresponds to the minimum
sum of service times. Instead, Bob’s decoder selects a threshold β = log (µi/λ), applies a function on
each codeword, and finds a unique codeword that generates an output for the function that is larger than
β.
Next, we describe Bob’s decoder in detail [35, p. 12]. For x¯ = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn+ and y¯ =
(y0, y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn+1+ , if x¯ is the sequence of packet timings before the flow passes through qi
(inter-arrival times), then the pdf of the observed packet timings y¯ (inter-departure times) is:
P(y¯|x¯) = eµ−λ(y0)
n∏
k=1
(yk − wk),
where eu(x) = ue−ux is the exponential pdf with mean 1/u, and wk = max{0,
∑k
i=1 xi −
∑k−1
i=0 yi} is
the kth waiting time, the amount of time that the queue waits until it receives the kth packet. Since the
packet timings of the fingerprinted flow is an instantiation of a Poisson process of rate λ, the joint pdf
of the inter-arrival times is
∏n
k=1 eλ(xk). Consequently, the pdf of y¯ is:
P(y¯) =
∫
Rn+
P(y¯|x¯)
n∏
k=1
eλ(xk)dx¯. (36)
Bob’s decoder finds a unique fingerprint (codeword) Wl from {Wl}l=ml=1 that satisfies P(y¯|Wl)P(y¯) > β; if such
a unique codeword does not exist, it outputs flow not fingerprinted.
Analysis: The analysis follows from that of Scenario 1. The only differences appear in the analysis of
Bob’s decoding error probability. The auxiliary threshold decoder used in the analysis of the mismatched
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decoder in [35, p. 413-417] provides what we need for our application. If Bob uses this detector, the
decoding error probability of a fingerprinted flow will be:
Pf2 → 0 as T →∞, (37)
which implies that if we generate m independent instantiations of a Poisson process of rate λ on a time
interval of length T2, W1, . . . ,Wm, we select one of them Wl and send a packet stream whose packet
timings follow Wl over the network, then the probability that at least one Wk 6= Wl satisfies P(y¯|Wl)P(y¯) > β
tends to zero, i.e.,
P(∃Wk 6=l : P(y¯|Wk)/P(y¯) > β|Wl sent )→ 0 as T →∞. (38)
Consider the case where Bob observes a flow that is not fingerprinted. Recall that the packet timings of
all the flows follow a Poisson process of rate λ. Denote by Z? an instantiation of a Poisson process that
corresponds to the packet timings of the this flow before it passes through the network. If Bob detects
a fingerprint, it must be that one of the fingerprints Wl in the codebook resulted in
P(y¯|Wl)
P(y¯) > β. Hence,
Pf3 = P
(
∃Wk : P(y¯|Wk)P(y¯) > β
∣∣∣∣Z? sent ) (39)
Recalling that W1, . . . ,Wm and Z? are independent instantiations of a Poisson process of rate λ, (37)
and (38) yield Pf3 → 0 as T →∞. Thus, Alice and Bob’s fingerprinting is reliable. 
B. Scenario 6: Alice fingerprints a subset of the flows and Bob observes flows with and without
fingerprints, Setting 2
Consider Scenario 6, which is the extension of Scenario 2 to the case where Bob observes flows with
and without fingerprints (Ff ⊂ FB): Alice fingerprints a subset of the flows she observes (Ff ⊂ FA),
flow rates are equal (λ), and Bob observes flows with and without fingerprints. We consider Setting 2
(see Fig. 1b), i.e., M parallel M/M/1 queues with single input and output. Alice fingerprints the input
flows of the network in the time interval [0, T ], and Bob extracts the fingerprints from the flows on the
output links of the network to infer the connections between input and output flows.
Similar to Scenario 5, Bob’s detector is able to distinguish whether a flow is fingerprinted. We
calculate the number of flows (m) that Alice and Bob can trace by fingerprinting, asymptotically as a
function of T .
Theorem 4.2. Consider Setting 2 (see Fig. 1b). In a set FA containing M flows with equal rates (λ), if
Bob observes flows with and without fingerprints (Ff ⊂ FB), Alice and Bob can invisibly and reliably
trace m flows in a time interval of length T , where m is given in (16), where C is replaced with
C ′′ = λ log
(
min
i
{µi}/λ
)
, (40)
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Note that the replacement of C with C ′′ is necessary since here we consider Setting 1 which implies
that the rates of interfering flows λ′i are zero.
Proof. The construction and analysis follow from those of Scenarios 2 with modifications due to the
change of Bob’s detector to detect whether a flow is fingerprinted or not. In addition, Alice does not
need to know which subset of the flows she observes are observed by Bob to fingerprint the. But, she
chooses an arbitrary subset of flows and fingerprints them. In general, each fingerprinted flow will not
be observed by Bob. However, since we determine the maximum number of flows that can be traced, we
assume that each fingerprinted flow will be observed by Alice. The analysis for Bob’s detector follows
from that of Scenario 5. 
In Theorem 4.2, Alice’s selection of subset might be due to the preference of Alice and Bob. But,
if there is no such preference, Alice can choose the flows randomly and independently to fingerprint
them. Next, we present Theorem 4.3 to address this case.
Theorem 4.3. Consider Setting 2 (see Fig. 1b). In a set FA containing M flows, if Alice fingerprints
each flow independently with probability q, each flow has rate λ, and Bob observes a set of flows that
contains flows with and without fingerprints (Ff ⊂ FB), then Alice and Bob can invisibly and reliably
trace
m = O
(
min
{
Mq, exp
(
TC
1 + α′/ ln(1 + 
2
2Mq2
)
)})
(41)
flows in a time interval of length T , where  is the invisibility parameter, and C ′′ and α′ are given
in (19) and (40), respectively.
Proof. The construction and analysis follows those of Theorem 4.2 with modifications due to the random
selection of the flows. Alice builds a fingerprint codebook of size m, where
m = exp
(
TC
1 + α′/ ln(1 + 
2
2Mq2
)
)
. (42)
She selects the flow f (A)i ∈ FA to be fingerprinted with probability q, independent of other flows. For
each flow f (A)i she generates an independent Bernoulli random variable Xi with P (Xi = 1) = q; she
selects a unique (unused) fingerprint from her codebook and embeds it in flow f (A)i if and only if
Xi = 1.
Similar to the analysis of Scenario 2, we can show that for reliable fingerprinting we require
m ≤ exp
(
TC
1 + α′/ ln(1 + 
2
2Mq2
)
)
, (43)
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which is satisfied by (42). Next, we show that Ns =
∑M
k=1 Xi = O(Mq). Consider random variables
Yi = Xi/q, i = 1, . . . ,M . Since E[Yi] = E[Xi]/q = 1, the weak law of large numbers (WLLN) yields
lim
T→∞
P
(
1
M
∑M
i=1 Yi > 1/2
)
= 1. Let γ = 1/2 and Xi = qYi. Thus, lim
T→∞
P
(∑M
i=1Xi > Mq/2
)
= 1.
Since Alice fingerprints min{m,Ns} flows, the number of flows that Alice and Bob can invisible and
reliably trace is (41).
In [1, Theorem 2], we presented values of q and M that yield a close to a maximal number of flows
that can be traced. 
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Willie’s error probability
First, we consider Scenario 1 and present the results of the simulation for Willie’s detection. Then,
we discuss how similar results apply to all of the scenarios with slight modifications.
Consider Scenario 1. Recall that when H0 is true (Alice is not fingerprinting), Willie observes flows
where each flow’s packet timing is governed by a Poisson process of rate λ. When H1 is true (Alice
is fingerprinting), the packet timing of each flow observed by Willie is governed by a Poisson process
of rate λ − √2λ/mT1 in the first phase and a Poisson process of rate λ in the second phase. Since
the statistical properties of the flows are the same for H0 and H1 in the second phase, he uses the
information obtained from his observations in the first phase to test whether Alice is fingerprinting.
Note that when H1 is true, Willie observes m flows each of whose packet rates is λ− 
√
2λ/mT1 in
the first phase. Similar to [29], we can show that a packet counter is an optimal detector for Willie.
He counts the total number of packets S in the first phase for all m flows, and sets a threshold U . If
S < λTm− U , he selects H1; otherwise, he selects H0.
We consider P(H0) = P(H1) = 0.5. The simulation parameters are λ = 7.36 packets/second,
min
i
{µi − λ′i} = 20 packets/second, C = 7.36 nats/second (see (8)), T = 3600× 11 seconds, ζ = 0.01,
 = 0.1, m = 10 (see (15)), U ∈ [0.07, 100]√λmT ≈ [80, 120000]. Alice reduces the rate of each packet
stream from λ to λ−r√2λ/mT1, and we plot receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for Willie
for r ∈ [0.1, 9] (see Fig. 5). Note that the x-axis and y-axis of this figure are Willie’s probability of
false-alarm (PFA) and true-detection (1-PMD), respectively. The number of trials is 8000. According to
Theorem 1, r = 1 corresponds to the case which yields covertness, as verified by the ROC curve. Note
that large values for r, which corresponds to more slow down of the packets by Alice in the first phase,
lead to detection by Willie with high probability.
Next, we discuss why these results apply to other scenarios. Note that Willie’s detection defers across
scenarios since he observes a different number of flows. However, in all scenarios Willie’s optimal
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Fig. 5: The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve for Willie’s detection. Alice reduces the rate of each packet stream
from λ to λ− r√2λ/mT1, and we draw ROC curves for r ∈ [0.1, 9].
detector is a packet counter. Since all of the links are governed by independent Poisson processes and
the sum of independent Poisson random variables (with distinct parameters) is another Poisson random
variable, Willie’s detection problem differs only slightly.
B. Probability that Alice runs out of packets
Recall that in all scenarios Alice slightly slows down the packet rate of each flow so as to buffer
packets. She does this to ensure that in the second phase, she does not run out of packets with high
probability. We denoted the probability that Alice runs out of packets by Pf1 , and recall we want to
achieve Pf1 < ζ .
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We consider a single link and plot the curve for the probability that Alice runs out of packets when
she reduces the rate from λ to λ− r′√2λ/(mT1) (see Fig. 6), where r′ ∈ [0, 0.5] is variable. We term
100r′ the percentage of ideal rate reduction. According to Theorem 1, r′ = 1 corresponds to the rate
reduction that yields Pf1 < ζ . The simulation parameters are λ = 20 packets/second, min
i
{µi − λ′i} = 25
packets/second, C = 4.46 nats/second (see (8)), T = 3600 × 2 seconds, ζ = 0.1,  = 0.1, m = 9
(see (15)). The number of trials is 10, 000. As expected, larger values of r′ yields a smaller probability
of failure for Alice. Although only the value of m is tied to Scenario 1, this result applies to all scenarios
with minor modifications.
Note that the ideal reduced rate in the first phase (λ − r′√2λ/(mT1) with r′ = 1) is expected to
achieve Pf ≤ ζ = 0.1. Although the simulation for r′ ∈ [0.6, 1] has not been done due to processing
time limits, the Fig. 6 shows that even with less rate reduction (r′ = 0.5) and hence less buffering, we
achieve a much smaller probability of failure (Pf1 ≤ ζ = 2× 10−4). So, our buffering requirements are
conservative rate reduction in the first phase is conservative. That leads to allocating a large portion of
T to the first phase, and a small portion to the second phase. The plot shows that in practice we can
reduce the rate in the first phase less, and allocate a smaller portion of T to the first phase.
C. Bob’s decoding error probability
We consider a single link and plot Bob’s error probability (Pf2), i.e., the probability that Bob
extracts a wrong fingerprint from the link. Although the simulation results presented here are according
to the number of links m derived from Scenario 1, this result also applies to all scenarios with
minor modifications. The simulation parameters are λ = 5.485 packets/second, min
i
{µi − λ′i} = 5.5
packets/second, C = 0.015 nats/second (see (8)), T = 3600 × 40 seconds, ζ = 0.15,  = 0.1, m = 13
(see (15)). The number of trials is 2, 000.
The maximum allowable size of the codebook is m = 13. For simulation, we let the size of the
codebook be br′′×mc, where r′′ ∈ [0.002, 1.2] (see Fig. 7). The x-axis is r′′. According to Theorem 1,
r′′ = 1 corresponds to the ideal codebook size that results arbitrarily small error probability for Bob.
Note that the results of Theorem 1 is based on Shannon’s random coding which relies on large T . If
we consider larger values for T , we expect to see small error probabilities for Bob’s decoding when the
size of the codebook is ideal or smaller than that r′′ ≤ 1. Currently, because of processing time limits,
we observe Pf2 = 0.02 when r′′ = 1.
Although T = 3600 × 40 seconds, the length of the second phase is only 173 seconds. In other
words, if Alice and Bob are given 40 hours, they only use about 3 minutes of that time to embed and
extract the fingerprints, and Alice uses the rest of the time to buffer packets in the first phase to ensure
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Fig. 6: The probability that Alice runs out of packets for a single link when, in the buffering phase, she reduces the packet
rate from λ to λ− r′√2λ/(mT1), where 100r′ is the percentage of ideal rate reduction.
her fingerprinting will be successful. As stated in Section VII-B, this is because the parameters for
packet buffering are conservative. Improving the parameters and reducing the amount of time needed
for buffering lies beyond the scope of this work since our primary goal is to establish the fundamental
limits. Noting that using only 3 minutes for embedding and extracting the fingerprints results in a
decoding probability of error Pf2 = 0.02, we can state that our current scheme is efficient in this way.
D. Robustness against processing time of queues
Bob’s detector relies on the fact that the queues are M/M/1 which implies the processing times of
the queues are i.i.d exponential random variables. Here, we consider M/G/1 queues, whose processing
times are i.i.d. samples of non-exponential random variables, and plot Bob’s decoding error probability.
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Fig. 7: The probability that Bob extracts a wrong fingerprint from a flow. Bob looks at the packet timings of the flow and
extracts the fingerprint from it according to the codebook shared with Alice. The size of the codebook is r′′ ×m, where m
is the ideal codebook size according to Theorem 1.
We let the processing times of the queue be i.i.d. instantiations of a Weibull distribution with shape
parameters 1, 2, 3, 4, with the same processing rate, mu. Note that the shape parameters 1 corresponds
to an exponential random variable.
Similar to Section VII-C, we consider a single link and plot Bob’s error probability (Pf2), i.e., the
probability that Bob extracts a wrong fingerprint from the link (see Fig. 8). Although the simulation
results presented here are according to the number of links m derived from Scenario 1, this result also
applies to all scenarios with minor modifications. The simulation parameters are the same as those of
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Fig. 8: The probability that Bob extracts a wrong fingerprint from a flow when the service times of the queue are i.i.d.
instantiations of exponential distribution and Weibull distribution with shape parameters 2, 3, 4 . Bob looks at the packet
timings of the flow and extracts the fingerprint from it according to the codebook shared with Alice. The size of the codebook
is r′′×m, where m is the ideal codebook size when the processing times are instantiations of an exponential random variable,
according to Theorem 1.
Section VII-C. According to Fig. 8, the change of distribution does not yield a major change in Bob’s
error probability, and thus Bob’s decoder is robust against this change, i.d., if the distribution of the
processing times of the queue changes from Weibull with shape parameter 1 to Weibull with shape
parameter 2, 3, 4.
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VIII. DISCUSSION
A. Source of the gain in Scenarios 2, 4, and 6
Comparing the results of Scenarios 1, 3, and 5 (Alice fingerprints all flows she observes) with those
of Scenarios 2, 4, and 6 (Alice fingerprints a subset of flows she observes), we notice a large gain for
the number of flows that can be fingerprinted when Alice fingerprints the flows with a small probability.
Intuitively, if H1 is true, in Scenarios 1, 3, and 5, Willie is certain that there is only one possibility: all
flows are slowed down by Alice in the first phase. However, if H1 is true, the number of possible sets
of flows that might have been slowed down by Alice in the first phase is
(
m
M
)
for Scenarios 2 and 4,
and 2M for Scenario 6, where sets whose cardinality is about Mq are more probable. Since a small
portion of the flows is fingerprinted in Scenarios 2, 4, and 6, Willie needs to investigate a large number
of flows to look for the decreasing of flow rates of a relatively (very) small random subset of those
flows. This makes invisibility much easier to achieve and leads to the significant gains observed.
B. Alternative characterization of m with respect to M for Scenarios 2,4, and 6
Consider Scenario 2 (Theorem 2). An alternative way to show the relation between the maximum
number of flows m that could be traced from a set of flows of size M observed by Alice is:
• If there exists a constant ξ < C such that M = O(eTξ), then m = O(√M).
• If for all ξ < C, M = ω(eξT ), then m = O(eTC5√M), for all C5 ∈ (0, C).
This applies to Scenario 4 (Theorem 3.2) and Scenario 6 (Theorem 4.2), replacing C with C ′ and C ′′,
respectively.
C. Alice’s knowledge about effective service times of the queues
We presented results assuming Alice knows the effective service rates of the queues, i.e., µi− λ′i for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ M . We can show that if Alice does not know the effective service rates, but she knows a
positive lower bound on each of them, then we achieve the same big-O results for the number of flows
that Alice and Bob can trace. Furthermore, if she does not know the lower bounds, our big-O results
achieved for Scenarios 1, 3, and 5 will change to Little-o results.
D. Sharing the fingerprinting codebook
The use of a secret pre-shared key has been largely addressed in security and cryptography [36], [37].
In practice, the distribution of secret keys can be done by face-to-face meeting, use of a trusted courier,
or sending the key through an existing encryption channel. In many scenarios a secure low throughput
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channel is available that the parties can use to share the key. Also, Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DH)
can be used for sharing such a key [38] over a public channel.
E. Delay performance
Our fingerprinting scheme requires that Alice first buffers packets, which increases the end-to-end
delay of the network. We can show that the average packet delay in Scenarios 1, 3, and 5 is O(√log T ),
and in Scenarios 2, 4, and 6 is O(√T ).
We have shown in the reliability analyses that the packet delay does not impact Bob’s decoding, and
he can extract fingerprints with arbitrarily small error probability. This is true because Bob extracts
the fingerprints from inter-packet delays. Furthermore, it does not help Willie’s detection. In other
words, in the invisibility analysis we have shown that although packets experience delays, Willie cannot
detect Alice and Bob’s fingerprinting. This is true because Willie does not have access to the original
packet timings; rather, he only knows the statistics of the packet timings which change only slightly
and are undetectable to him. Consider the users of the network. Although this delay is not tolerable in
applications such as voice over IP, there are many applications such as file transfer that allow for this.
F. Unwinding packets in Alice’s buffer
Note that Alice’s fingerprinting requires that she first buffers packets. We can show that Alice will
have O(√T ) packets in her buffer after the second phase ends at t = T . To unwind the packets, after
t = T , Alice relays all the flows she receives at the rate she receives them, and insert packets from her
buffer according to a Poisson process of rate ∆. Similar to the arguments where we showed that the
change of rate from λ−∆ is undetectable to Willie, we show that the change of rate from λ to λ+ ∆
is undetectable to Willie, and thus Alice’s unwinding is invisible. Similar analyses has been addressed
in our previous works [29], [30].
IX. FUTURE WORK
The future work consists of alternative network models and extending the current network model.
We will consider the cases where 1) packets drop; 2) packets are duplicated; 3) the order of the packets
change; 4) packets are fragmented; and 5) flows are re-packetized. In addition, we will apply the results
of [30] to extend our results to G/M/1 queues and we will consider other queuing models. Furthermore,
we will apply the work of [39] to consider a network of parallel links where each link contains a set of
M/M/1 single input/output queues in tandem, and then we will extend this to tandem queues shared
between a flow between Alice and Bob (main flow) and independent interfering flows. Furthermore, we
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will use [40, Corollary 3.3] to relax the condition of independent interference for queues on each route.
Moreover, we will extend our model to a feedforward multiclass product form network [41] containing
parallel links where each link consists of multiple M/M/1 queues in tandem shared between a flow
between Alice and Bob (main flow) as well as interfering flows.
X. CONCLUSION
We have presented the construction and analysis for invisible fingerprinting of flows to infer the
connections between input and output links of a network that is modeled as M independent, parallel,
and work-conserving M/M/1 queues with background traffic. In a setting where flows whose packet
timings are governed by Poisson processes visit Alice, Willie, the network, and Bob respectively, we have
presented a construction where Alice fingerprints flows in a time interval of length T by manipulating
packet timing of the flows according to a fingerprint codebook shared with Bob and unknown to
Willie. In particular, each codeword (fingerprint) of the codebook is a unique flow identifier which
corresponds to a sequence of inter-packet delays. If flow rates are equal, Bob observes only flows with
fingerprints, and Alice chooses to fingerprint all M input flows of the network that she observes, Alice
and Bob can invisibly trace the fingerprinted flows as long as m = M = O(T/ log T ). But, if she
fingerprints a subset of the flows Ff , Alice and Bob can invisibly trace the fingerprinted flows as long
as m = |Ff | = o(min{
√
M, eTC1}), for all C1 ∈ (0, C), with more accurate characterizations of m
with respect to M presented in (16) and (26). Similar results hold for arbitrary flow rates as well as
the case where Bob observes flows with and without fingerprints, with minor modifications.
APPENDIX
A. Applicability of covertness metric when P(H0) 6= P(H1): Definition 1 implies that when
P(H0) = P(H1) = 1/2, Alice can make Willie’s detector operate as close as desired to a detector that
disregards Willie’s observation, e.g., tosses a fair coin to decide whether Alice is fingerprinting.
For P(H0) 6= P(H1), if Alice’s scheme satisfies the invisibility metric in Definition 1, she can also
make Willie’s detector operate as close as desired to a detector that disregards Willie’s observations,
as follow. Recall that P(w)e = PFA+PMD2 is Willie’s error probability when prior probabilities are equal,
P(H0) = P(H1) = 0.5. Denote by P′(w)e Willie’s error probability when prior probabilities are not equal.
Then:
P′(w)e = (1− P(H1))PFA + P(H1)PMD,
≥ 2 min (P(H1), 1− P(H1))PFA + PMD
2
,
≥ 2 min (P(H1), 1− P(H1))P(w)e , (44)
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By Definition 1, if Alice’s fingerprinting is invisible, then for large enough T she can achieve P(w)e >
1
2
− , for all  > 0. Hence, (44) yields:
P′(w)e ≥ min (P(H1), 1− P(H1))(1− 2),
≥ min (P(H1), 1− P(H1))− ′, (45)
where ′ = 2min (P(H1), 1− P(H1)). Consider a detector that disregards Willie’s observations: if
P(H0) > 0.5, Willie always decides that Alice is fingerprinting; otherwise, Willie decides that she is
not. Using this detector, Willie achieves P′(w)e = min(P(H1), 1 − P(H1)). From (45), Alice can make
Willie’s detector operate as close as desired to this detector.
B. Proof of (3): Denote by P0 the pdf for Willie’s observations in the first phase under the null
hypothesis H0 (Alice is not fingerprinting), and by P1 the joint pdf for corresponding observations under
the hypothesis H1 (Alice is fingerprinting) in the first phase. Note that under H1, Alice in the first phase
slows down the flow fi from rate λi to λi −∆i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Since the number of observed packets
for Poisson processes is a sufficient statistic for hypothesis testing [29],
P0 =
m∏
i=1
Pλi(ni),
P1 =
m∏
i=1
Pλi−∆i(ni),
where Pλ(n) is the probability mass function (pmf) of the number of packets in time T1 for a flow
whose packet timings are governed by a Poisson process with rate λ, and T1 is the length of the first
phase. Observe
D(Pλi−∆i(ni)||Pλi(ni))
= ∆iT1 − (λi −∆i)T1 log λi
λi −∆i ≤
T1∆
2
i
2(λi −∆i) , (46)
where the last steps follows from the inequality ln(1 + x) ≥ x− x2/2 for x ≥ 0. Thus,
D(P1||P0) =
m∑
i=1
D(Pλi−∆i(ni)||Pλi(ni)) ≤
m∑
i=1
T1∆
2
i
2(λi −∆i) .
Let ∆i = 
√
2λi
mT1
, where  > 0. Therefore, D(P1||P0) ≤ 2m
∑m
i=1
λi
λi−
√
2λi/T1
. For large enough T1,
λi
λi−
√
2λi/T1
≤ 2, and thus D(P1||P0) ≤ 22 as T1 → ∞. Combining with (22), P(w)e ≥ 12 − 2 ≥ 12 − .
Consequently, the first phase is invisible.
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C. Proof of (14): Consider the following fact:
Fact 1. For x, y > 0, if x < y/W (y), then x log x < y.
Proof. Assume x′ = y/W (y). First, we show that x′ log x′ = y. From the definition of the Lambert-W
function, W (y)eW (y) = y. Therefore, W (y) = log y
W (y)
. Consequently,
x′ log x′ =
y
W (y)
log
y
W (y)
=
y
W (y)
W (y) = y. (47)
Since x′ = y/W (y), x < y/W (y) implies that x < x′. Because x log x is an increasing function of x,
x log x < x′ log x′ = y, and the proof is complete. 
Next, for both cases m ≥ 1 + mα and m < 1 + mα we show that TC > (1 + mα) logm, which
implies (14). Consider m ≥ 1 +mα. Note that (15) implies m < TC
W (TC)
. Therefore, Fact 1 yields:
TC > m logm.
Since m ≥ 1 +mα,
TC > m logm > (1 +mα) logm.
Now, consider m < 1+mα. Note that (15) implies that m < α−1
(
TC
W (TC)
− 1
)
, which implies 1+mα <
TC
W (TC)
Hence, Fact 1 yields
TC > (1 +mα) log (1 +mα) ≥ (1 +mα) logm,
where the last inequality follows from m < 1 +mα. Consequently, (15) satisfies (14).
D. Proof of (23): Observe:
D(P1||P0) (a)= MD (pPλ−∆(n) + (1− p)Pλ(n)||Pλ(n)) ,
(b)
= ME1
[
ln
(
pPλ−∆(n) + (1− p)Pλ(n)
Pλ(n)
)]
,
= ME1
[
ln
(
pe∆T1
(
λ−∆
λ
)n
+ (1− p)
)]
,
(c)
≤ MpE1
[
e∆T1
(
λ−∆
λ
)n]
−Mp,
(d)
= Mp2(e∆
2T1/λ − 1) (e)= 2/2. (48)
where (a) follows from the chain rule for relative entropy [42, Eq. (2.67)], E1[·] denotes expected
value with respect to the pdf (pPλ−∆(ni) + (1− p)Pλ(ni)), (b) follows from the definition of the
Kullback–Leibler divergence, (c) is true since ln(1 + x) ≤ x, (d) is true since
E1
[(
λ−∆
λ
)n]
= e−∆T1
(
pe∆
2T1/λ + (1− p)
)
,
and (e) follows from substituting the values of ∆, p, and T1 given in (20), (21), and (17) respectively.
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E. Proof of (24): The first difference is in the number of packets that Alice can buffer from
each flow in the first phase. Here, since Alice slows down each flow from rate λ to λ−∆, where ∆ is
given in (20), the probability that Alice can buffer more than ∆T1/2 packets in the second phase tends
to one as T →∞. Therefore, letting t = T1 and k = ∆T1/2 =
√
λT1 ln
(
1 + 
2M
2m2
)
/4 in (10) yields:
lim
T→∞
Pf1 ≤ 1− lim
T→∞
erf
√T1 ln (1 + 2M2m2 )
8T2
 . (49)
The second difference in the analysis of Pf1 is due to differences in the expressions for T1 and T2.
By (17) and (18), T1/T2 = α′/ ln(1 + 
2M
2m2
). Therefore, (49) yields:
lim
T→∞
Pf1 ≤ 1− erf
(√
α′
8
)
= 1− erf
(

√
α
8
)
, (50)
where the last step is true since α′ = 2α. By (12),
F. Proof of (26): If M = O(1), by (16), the left hand side (LHS) of (26) is m = M = O(1).
Now, consider the right hand side (RHS) of (26). Since m = O(1), there exists ρ such that for large
enough T , m ≤ ρ. Consequently, the RHS of (26) is Ω(e TC1+ρ′ ), where ρ′ = α′/ ln(1 + 2
2ρ
). Thus, (26) is
satisfied.
If M = ω(1) and M = O(e2TC), m = o(min√M, eTC1), where C1 ∈ (0, C). Thus, the LHS of (26)
is o(eTC1). To show (26) is satisfied, it suffices to show that there exists a constant C ′1 ∈ (C1, C) such
that makes the RHS of (26) Ω(eTC′1), which is true since
exp
(
TC
1 + α′/ ln(1 + 
2m
2M2
)
)
≥ eTC
(
1−α′/ ln(1+ 2M
2m2
)
)
(51)
provided that 1/(1+x) ≥ 1−x for all x > 0. Note that m = o(min√M, eTC1) implies that m ∈ o(√M),
and thus α′/ ln(1 + 
2M
2m2
) in the RHS of (51) gets as small as desired.
If M = ω(e2TC), m = Θ(eTC2) for any C2 ∈ (0, C), and thus the LHS of (26) is Θ(eTC2). Now,
consider the RHS of (26). Since m = Θ(eTC2) and M = ω(e2TC), m = o(
√
M), and thus α′/ ln(1+ 
2M
2m2
)
in the RHS of (51) gets as small as desired. Consequently, there exists a constant C ′2 ∈ (C2, C) such
that the RHS of (26) is Ω(eTC′2). Hence, (26) is satisfied.
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